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method depreciation eligibility for property placed in service
after 1990.  I.R.C. § 179(d)(1), as amended b y
RRA 1990, Sec. 11801 .  The term Section 1245
property, while similar to the definition of Section 38
property, is significantly more narrow in several respects and
more expansive in a few instances.  Thus, horses are not
ineligible for expense method depreciation under the new
rules.  Moreover, the "wash sale" rules for livestock which
appeared in the definition of Section 38 property are not part
of the definition of Section 1245 property.  I.R.C. §
48(a)(6) before amendment by RRA 1990 .
Likewise, the Section 1245 property definition does not
include mention of (1) eligibility of elevators and escalators,
(2) the special rules for property outside the United States,
(3) property used for lodging, (4) property used by certain tax
exempt organizations, (5) property used by governmental
units or foreign persons, (6) property completed abroad or
predominantly of foreign origin, (7) and boilers fueled by oil
or gas.  I.R.C. §§ 48(A)(1)(C),(2), (3), (4), ( 5 ) ,
(6), (10) before amendment by RRA 1990 .  The
Section 1245 property definition, on the other hand, excludes
more items subject to amortization that the Section 38
property definition.  Compare I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(C)
with I.R.C. § 48(a)(8).
Both definitions include personal property (although the
Section 38 definition refers to   tangible   personal property);
single purpose agricultural and horticultural structures; and
"other tangible property" used for storage, for research or as
an integral part of manufacturing, production or extraction or
of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical
energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services.
For many farm and ranch taxpayers the 1990 amendment
will make no difference in eligibility for expense method
depreciation.  However, some taxpayers will find the new
definition to be quite different as applied to their unique
factual situation.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
OPEN AND NOTORIOUS.  Prior to the plaintiff's
or defendant's ownership of their neighboring land, the prior
owner of the defendant's land had sold a strip of land which
bordered the plaintiff's land but the purchaser of the strip
fenced off a strip so far on to the plaintiff's land that a
portion of the plaintiff's land was on the defendant's side of
the strip.  The defendant's use of the disputed area included
planting and harvesting trees, cutting a road, hunting and
posting "no trespassing" signs.  The defendant also repaired
much of the fence on the defendant's side of the strip such
that the fence could contain cattle.  The court held that the
defendant had open and notorious occupation of the disputed
area and that the area had been enclosed by a substantial
fence, even though part of the fence was in disrepair.
Klinefelter v. Dutch, 467 N.W.2d 192 (Wis .
App. 1991).
ANIMALS
HORSES.  The plaintiff brought an action against the
owner of horse riding stables for personal injuries resulting
from a fall from a horse.  The court held that the defendant
was not liable because the defendant had no prior knowledge
of the horse's alleged vicious propensity.  The court found
that a thoroughbred horse was not inherently dangerous.
Landes v. H.E. Farms, Inc., 564 N.Y.S.2d 1 5 1
(App. Div. 1991).
BANKING
GOOD FAITH.  The plaintiffs had borrowed money
from the defendant for their dairy operation for several years
but had decided to quit the dairy operation by participating in
the federal Dairy Termination Program.  As part of a request
to renegotiate the loan with the defendant in light of the
possible DTP participation, the plaintiffs submitted a
proposal for restructuring their loans but the defendant
rejected the proposal.  The plaintiffs argued that the
defendant had violated a good faith duty to consider the loan
restructuring proposal.  The plaintiffs argued that the duty of
good faith dealing arose because of the longstanding
relationship between the parties.  The court held that no
good faith duty arose from the course of dealing between the
parties and was not required by the loan agreements between
the parties.  Badgett v. Security State Bank, 8 0 7
P.2d 356 (Wash. 1991), rev'g  56 Wash. App.
872, 786 P.2d 302 (1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtors claimed an exemption
in their interest as vendees of a land contract.  The
exemption was not objected to but the trustee applied for
judicial approval to sell the property with distribution of the
proceeds to the land contract vendor, to the debtors in the
amount of their claimed exemption and to the estate.  The
court held that the exemption caused the land to revert to the
debtors and the land was no longer estate property subject to
sale by the trustee.  Seifert v. Selby, 125 B.R. 1 7 4
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
The debtor was not allowed an exemption for firearms as
household goods.  The court allowed an exemption for the
debtor's interest in a pension plan where the plan was less
than $8,000 and the debtor would not accumulate substantial
funds beyond what would be normal or anticipated.  In re
Coffman, 125 B.R. 238 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
The debtor's interests in three ERISA qualified profit
sharing plans were included in the bankruptcy estate and
were not exempt because the plans were not reasonably
necessary for the debtor's maintenance and support.  In re
Davis, 125 B.R. 242 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
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The debtor received money from a third party's insurance
company in settlement of a personal injury action resulting
from an automobile accident.  The court held that the money
was not exempt because Arizona had no exemption for
personal injury claims and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1126(A)(3)
did not apply where the money was not paid under an
employer's insurance plan to the debtor as an employee.  In
re  Hoffpauir, 125 B.R. 269 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1990) .
As part of a divorce property settlement, the debtors
agreed to sell the homestead and share the proceeds.  The
house was sold pre-petition and the proceeds were placed in
separate accounts.  The debtors each claimed a homestead
exemption in their separate bankruptcy cases.  The court
held that the debtors could not exempt the proceeds of the
pre-petition voluntary sale of the homestead.  In re  Blair,
125 B.R. 303 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1991).
  CHAPTER 11  
ELIGIBILITY.  The owner of an apartment building,
ranch, industrial plant and office building transferred the
assets to a trust with the owner as trustee and with the
purpose to manage the properties until the trustee's children
could take over management of the properties.  The court
held that the trust was not eligible for Chapter 11
bankruptcy because the beneficiaries had not contributed to
the assets or management of the businesses owned by the
trust and, although the trust did not prohibit the transfer of
interests in the trust, the trust was formed with the intent to
keep the assets in the trustee's family.  In re  BKC
Realty Trust, 125 B.R. 65 (Bankr. D. N . H .
1991) .
PLAN .  Under the debtors' plan to pay a secured
creditor, one parcel of farmland would be sold under an
existing purchase contract with the proceeds paid to the
secured creditor, another parcel would be immediately
surrendered to the secured creditor and the third parcel would
be held for sale for 300 days and surrendered to the secured
creditor if not sold within that time.  The third parcel was
leased on a crop share basis with the debtor receiving the
rent.  Although the creditor was oversecured on the land
involved, the court held that the 300 day delay and
partitioning of the farmland placed the risk of loss of value
on the secured creditor and the plan was not confirmed.  The
court noted that during the 300 days of deferral of payment
on the third parcel, the secured creditor would not receive
any interest or principal payments on the remaining amount
owed, yet the debtor would be receiving rent.  Matter o f
Martindale, 125 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991).
  CHAPTER 12  
ATTORNEY FEES.  During the pendency of the
debtors' Chapter 12 plan, the debtors hired an attorney to
represent them in a real estate foreclosure proceeding
involving land which was administered in the bankruptcy
case.  The attorney did not request court approval for the
services.  The court held that the attorney fees paid for the
services were estate property and were to be returned to the
trustee because the attorney failed to acquire prior court
approval.  Matter of Samford, 125 B.R. 230 (E .D.
Mo. 1991).
PLAN.  In confirming the debtors' Chapter 12 plan,
the Bankruptcy Court had required the debtors to make all
payments on secured claims through the trustee, did not
reduce a secured claim by the cost of liquidating the
collateral, and required the debtors to retain their stock in the
secured creditor land bank.  The District Court reversed the
Bankruptcy Court's order for payments only through the
trustee and provided ten factors to be weighed in determining
whether the debtor could make payments directly to secured
creditors without payment of the trustee fee.  The court also
reversed the lower court and held that a secured claim could
be reduced by the hypothetical costs of liquidating the
collateral, even where the debtor would retain the collateral.
The court upheld the order requiring the debtor to retain the
land bank stock.  In re  Overholt, 125 B.R. 2 0 2
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
  CHAPTER 13  
PLAN.  The debtor's Chapter 13 plan provided for
payments on a promissory note secured by the debtor's
residence under the terms of the note and payment of an
arrearage on the note plus interest over the 36 months of the
plan.  The secured creditor had accelerated the note pre-
petition.  The court held that the de-acceleration of the note
and payment of the arrearage over the plan length was not an
unacceptable modification of the creditor's rights under
Section 1322(b)(2).  In re  Smith, 125 B.R. 2 4 0
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
AUTOMATIC STAY .  The IRS had filed a pre-
petition levy on the debtor's wages which the IRS failed to
lift upon the debtor's filing for bankruptcy.  In addition, a
second levy was made post-petition after the IRS received
notice of the bankruptcy filing.  Although the IRS returned
the funds received under the second levy, the court held that
the 90 day period taken to return the funds was unreasonable
and allowed the debtor 11 percent interest on the funds from
the date of levy until the date of the refund.  The court also
allowed the debtor 11 percent interest on funds levied under
the pre-petition levy but received post-petition.  Matter o f
Fernandez, 125 B.R. 317 (Bankr. M.D. F la .
1991) .
CLAIMS.  When the IRS failed to file a claim in the
debtor's bankruptcy case, the debtor filed a claim for
personal income tax and employee withholding taxes owed
by the debtor.  The IRS later filed an amended claim
increasing the amounts owed in both categories.  The court
held that the Bankruptcy Court had the discretion to allow
the amendment and did not abuse the discretion in allowing
the amendment where the amendment only increased the
amount of the claim.  In re  Kolstad, 928 F.2d 1 7 1
(5th Cir. 1991), aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g
101 B.R. 492 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 1989).
The IRS had filed a timely claim for taxes owed by the
debtors for one pre-bankruptcy tax year.  Although the
debtors had listed other disputed tax claims on their
bankruptcy schedules, the IRS agent in charge of the case
failed to discover the other claims and the internal procedures
of the IRS failed to discover the error until after the claims
bar date.  The IRS filed an amended claim for the disputed
taxes which involved other pre-bankruptcy taxable years.
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The court held that the amended claim was not allowed
because the claim involved different taxes and the IRS failed
to show excusable neglect for failing to file the amended
claim on time.  In re  Nalle, 125 B.R. 164 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1991).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The court summarily
held that the holding of Zajac v. Federal Land Bank, 909
F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1990) (no private right of action to
enforce section 2202a of the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987), was not limited to Section 2202a of the Act.
Euerle Farms v. Farm Credit Services of S t .
Paul, 928 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1991).
The defendants asserted as a defense in a foreclosure
action brought by the plaintiff that the plaintiff failed to
comply with the plaintiff's loan restructuring and
forbearance regulations.  The court held that such a defense
was available and allowed the defendants discovery of
documents from the plaintiff to support the defense.  Farm
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 7 5 8
F.Supp. 1368 (D. Mont. 1990).
The defendants challenged the plaintiff's compliance with
the plaintiff's farm loan restructuring regulations, claiming
that the plaintiff used an erroneous valuation of the
defendants' farm property in determining that restructuring of
the defendant's loan was not required.  The court held that
the defendants' mere assertion of another valuation of the
property was insufficient to demonstrate an arbitrary
decision by the plaintiff in not restructuring the loan.
Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Nilsen, 7 5 8
F.Supp. 1372 (D. Mont. 1990).
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has announced an
interim rule changing the status of Indiana from a Class
Free to Class A state.  56 Fed. Reg. 19545 (April
29, 1991).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM .  The plaintiffs,
production credit associations, challenged as
unconstitutional 12 U.S.C. § 2278b-9 which required a
purchase of "stock" from the Farm Credit System Financial
Assistance Corporation.  The court held that the requirement
did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the stock
purchase requirement was rationally related to the legitimate
purpose of revitalizing the Farm Credit System and was not
an unconstitutional taking because the PCA's should have
expected to be required to provide additional financial help
for the system in times of economic stress.  Colorado
Springs Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit
Admin., 758 F. Supp. 6 (D. D.C. 1991).
GRAIN STANDARDS .  The FGIS has issued
proposed rules to establish grain standards for Canola.  5 6
Fed. Reg. 20374 (May 3, 1991).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT .  The
plaintiff was a surety for the bond held by a packer subject
to the bond requirements of the P & S Act and had paid
unpaid sellers of hogs to the packer under the bond in
exchange for the sellers' rights in the statutory trust fund.
The defendant had extended a line of credit to a customer of
the packer and had obtained an agreement with the packer
under which the packer subordinated its interest in accounts
receivables of the customer to the security interest of the
defendant.  The court held that the plaintiff surety had
acquired the hog sellers' rights in the P&S Act statutory
trust and that the agreement of the packer to subordinate its
interests in the customer's accounts receivable was
ineffective to remove those receivables from the trust.  The
court also held that the customer was not entitled to a share
of the statutory trust funds because the customer purchased
dressed hogs from the packer.  Liberty Mut. Ins. C o .
v. Bankers Trust Co., 758 F.Supp. 890 ( S . D .
N.Y. 1991).  
PRICE SUPPORT-COTTON.  The CCC has
issued proposed regulations concerning the price support
program for cotton to comply with FACTA 1990.  Among
the changes, the proposed regulations provide that if a
producer executes an option to purchase cotton under loan
and the title, risk of loss and beneficial interest in the cotton
remain with the producer until the buyer exercises the
option, the producer will not be considered to have divested
the beneficial interest in the cotton.  The primary purpose of
the provision is to prevent the cotton from being included in
the buyer's bankruptcy estate.  56 Fed. Reg. 20554
(May 6, 1991).
PRICE SUPPORT-TOBACCO.  The ASCS has
announced that the price support level for 1991 burley
tobacco is $1.584 per pound.  56 Fed. Reg. 19973
(May 1, 1991).  The ASCS has announced that the price
support level for 1991 flue-cured tobacco is $1.528 per
pound.  56 Fed. Reg. 19975 (May 1, 1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GIFT.  Two taxpayers owned 100 percent of the
corporation's stock and the stock was subject to a buy-sell
agreement which determined the price at which stock must
first be offered to the other shareholder before sale to any
other party.  The corporation established an ESOP and
purchased stock for the ESOP from one of the shareholders
at the fair market value which exceeded the option price
under the buy-sell agreement and the non-selling shareholder
agreed to waive the shareholder's right of first purchase and
the buy-sell restrictions on the stock purchased by the
ESOP.  The IRS ruled that the waiver of the right of first
purchase at the lower price resulted in a gift to the selling
shareholder of the difference between the selling price and
the price set by the buy-sell agreement.  Ltr. R u l .
9117035, Jan. 25, 1991.
The taxpayer made several transfers of money to the
taxpayer's children, followed by loans of the same amount
from the children to the taxpayer.  The IRS disallowed
deductions for the interest paid on the loans.  The court held
that the transfers of money to the children lacked donative
intent and the transfers were only schemes to create interest
deductions.  Muserlian v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,066 (2d Cir. 1991).
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INSTALLMENT PAYMENT.  The taxpayers,
brother and sister, received partial interests in trust in
commercial property which was held by the decedent as a
closely-held business.  The decedent's estate elected
installment payment of federal estate tax.  Upon distribution
of trust principal, the taxpayers were to receive partial
interests in all trust property.  Instead, the taxpayers agreed
to a distribution which would distribute undivided interests
in each property to the taxpayers.  In equalization of the
shares, the sister received non-business property in exchange
for the closely-held property.  The sister then transferred the
property to a grantor trust.  The IRS ruled that the
exchanges of property would not cause recognition of gain
except as to boot received to equalize the taxpayers' shares.
The nonrecognition was subject to the related party rule.
The distribution of the sister's share to a grantor trust would
also not cause recognition of gain unless the trust further
transferred the property or the trust terminated as a grantor
trust.  The IRS ruled that the exchange of partial interests in
the closely-held property between the taxpayers was not a
disposition causing acceleration of the installment payments
of estate tax.  The IRS also ruled that the less than 50
percent disposition of closely-held property by the sister for
non-closely-held property would not cause acceleration of
federal estate tax but would be added to any future
dispositions for purposes of the 50 percent test.  Ltr. R u l .
9116008, Jan. 15, 1991.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
bequeathed to the surviving spouse the minimum amount of
estate property that would result in the lowest amount of
federal estate tax.  The executor claimed a specific sum as a
marital deduction but did not list all of the specific property
on Schedule M, Part 2 which would be included in the
marital deduction but the executor included a statement that
the executor elected to treat as QTIP a fractional portion of
the property passing to the marital trust in the amount
necessary to reduce the federal estate tax to zero.  The IRS
ruled that because of the operation of the formula marital
deduction bequest and the fractional QTIP election, the
specific assets need not be identified on Schedule M, Part 2.
Ltr. Rul. 9116003, Dec. 27, 1990.
In the decedent's will, the residuary estate was to pass in
trust to the surviving spouse and to qualify for the marital
deduction to the extent allowed by law and to the extent
elected by the estate executor.  In filing the estate tax return,
the executor did not check the box in Schedule M indicating
any QTIP election and did not list the property elected as
QTIP on Schedule M, Part 2 (Form 706 1987).  The
executor did deduct the residuary trust property from the
gross estate in calculating the estate tax but only listed
property    not  subject to a QTIP election.  The IRS ruled that
the QTIP election was invalid.  Ltr. Rul. 9117007 ,
Jan. 11, 1991.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  In making a
special use valuation election on the estate return, the estate
included appraisals of the farmland made by the county tax
assessor's office and a computation that appeared to use
average cash rentals and average real estate taxes but without
details of the computation.  The IRS requested "copies of
written appraisals" and "accrual comparable rentals and their
ad valorem tax data" and the estate provided (1) notarized
affidavits of cash rents, (2) county tax valuation cards, (3) an
affidavit from the county agricultural extension office
identifying the comparables used, (4) an affidavit from the
county tax appraiser indicating the standards for appraising
agricultural land, and (5) county tax valuation cards.  The
IRS ruled that the special use election was valid because the
election contained satisfactory appraisals and the valuation
method used and the estate provided substantiating data when
requested.  The IRS noted that although the valuation
method was satisfactory for the election, the special use
valuation claimed on the estate return may not be acceptable
to the IRS; thus, a valid election does not require an accurate
valuation, but does require an acceptable method with
substantiating data.  Ltr. Rul. 9117006, Dec. 3 1 ,
1990 .
The taxpayer owned two parcels of land operated as a
dairy.  Under the taxpayer's will, the land will pass to two
children.  In 1977, one of the children changed the operation
to a horse boarding operation and was responsible for
producing hay, feeding the horses, care of machinery and
repairing improvements.  In 1981, the other child changed
the operation of some of the land to a christmas tree farm
and was responsible for planting, care and harvesting of the
trees.  The operations continued to the present.  The IRS
held that the children would be qualified heirs and the
property would be qualified real property eligible for special
use valuation.  Ltr. Rul. 9117046, Jan. 29, 1991.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH.  The decedent established a revocable trust under
which the trustee was to pay trust income to the decedent or
to whomever the decedent directed and the decedent had the
power to withdraw trust principal.  The remainder of the
trust was payable to trusts for the decedent's descendants.
Within the three years before the decedent's death, the
decedent made various gifts of trust property from the trust
to children and grandchildren.  The IRS ruled that the gifts
made within three years of the decedent's death were
includible in the decedent's gross estate to the extent the
gifts were paid from trust income.  Payments of trust
income to persons other than the decedent were considered a
relinquishment of the power to revoke the trust.  However,
the gifts were not includible to the extent made from trust
corpus, because trust corpus could only be distributed to the
decedent; thus, those gifts were considered made by the
decedent separate from any revocation of the trust.  Ltr.
Rul. 9117003, Oct. 16, 1990.
The decedent established a revocable trust with the
decedent as beneficiary and trustee with the power to make
distributions of trust property to the descendants of the
decedent.  The trust was amended to create co-trustees.  The
decedent transferred some trust proeprty to other trusts for
family memebers, and, after the decedent became mentaly
incompentent, the co-trustees made further transfers to those
trusts.  The court held that the transfers made by the
decedent within three years of death were not included in the
decedent's gross estate because the transfers were considered
to be made to the decedent and then made to the donees.  The
transfers by the co-trustees, however, were included int he
decedent's gross estate becuase the transfers were considered a
relinquishment of the decedent's power to revoke the trust as
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to the assets transferred.  Est. of Jalkut v. Comm'r,
96 T.C. No. 27 (1991).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD.  The IRS has ruled that
a corporation with employees who perform veterinary
services is a qualified personal service corporation eligible to
use the cash method of accounting and eligible to use a
taxable year other than a calendar year if the corporation
establishes a business purpose for the non-calendar taxable
year.  Rev. Rul. 91-30, I.R.B. 1991-19, 4.
The taxpayers merged three corporations: (1) a C
corporation using the accrual method of accounting, (2) a
family farm C corporation required to change from a cash
method to accrual, the farm price method, and maintain a
suspense account because of gross receipts in excess of $25
million, and (3) an S corporation using the accrual method.
The merged corporation elected S corporation status.  The
IRS ruled that the suspense account would not be recaptured
but the resulting corporation would be required to maintain
the account and would be subject to recapture.  In the short
taxable year as an S corporation, the gross receipts from
farming would be annualized for purposes of the accounting
method required under Section 447(i)(4).  Any income
included in gross income with respect to the suspense
account would be treated as recognized built-in gain.  Ltr.
Rul. 9117055, Jan. 30, 1991.
COOPERATIVES.  A tax-exempt farm cooperative
was audited and found to have dealt with nonmember
producers/patrons on a noncooperative basis.  The
cooperative requested that the loss of tax-exempt status
based on this finding be applied prospectively from the date
of notification of loss of tax-exempt status.  The IRS ruled
that the loss of tax-exempt status applied to the entire
taxable year.  Ltr. Rul. 9114002, Nov. 27, 1990.
DISASTER LOSSES .  The IRS has announced a
list of areas, designated by the President as disaster areas, in
which taxpayers are eligible to elect special treatment of
losses from disasters under I.R.C. § 165(i).  Ann. 91 -66 ,
I.R.B. 1991-17, 29.
INTEREST.  Two shareholders of an S Corporation
purchased some of the stock held by the other shareholders
and the corporation purchased the remaining shares of the
other shareholders in cash and promissory notes.  The IRS
ruled that the following method of allocation of interest
under the promissory notes was reasonable:
1.  At the end of each month the book values of the
corporation's assets were segregated into classes identified as
business assets, passive activity assets, investment assets
and personal assets.
2.  A ratio equal to the total book value of assets in each
class to the total book value of all assets was computed each
month.
3.  An average ratio was computed based on the number
of months in the taxable year of the corporation.  Ltr.
Rul. 9116008, Jan. 10, 1991.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES.  The IRS has adopted
as final regulations governing the limitations on deferred
like-kind exchanges.  See 1 Agri. L. Digest  106 (1990).
56 Fed. Reg. 19933 (May 1, 1991).
  PARTNERSHIPS  
BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.  The
taxpayer sold a 24 percent interest in a partnership to a
partnership owned by the taxpayer's spouse and children for
a promissory note for $2.4 million, payable in two balloon
payments in 12 years, with only interest of 6 percent
payable monthly for the life of the note.  The selling
partnership increased the basis of 24 percent of its assets to
equal the purchase price of the partnership interest and
calculated depreciation based on the new basis.  The court
held that the increase in basis of the selling partnership
assets was limited to the fair market value of those assets at
the time of sale, with the remaining amount of the purchase
price to be allocated to non-depreciable assets.  Muserlian
v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,066
(2d Cir. 1991).
PRE-PRODUCTION EXPENSES .  The IRS has
withdrawn G.C.M. 39791 which held that the cost of
fertilizer applied to land with standing trees and bare land to
be used for reforestation must be amortized over the
fertilizer's expected useful life.  G.C.M. 39844.
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.  Two brothers formed a
corporation to operate a plumbing business with the
taxpayer as plumber and the other brother as manager.  The
taxpayer had authority to write corporate checks and wrote
many for dividend payments to himself.  Although the
taxpayer knew little about accounting and management of
corporations, the accountant eventually informed the
taxpayer of the unpaid employment taxes and the potential
for the taxpayer's personal liability for the taxes.  The court
held that the taxpayer was a responsible person who
willfully failed to pay federal employment taxes and was
subject to the 100 percent penalty under Section 6672.  The
court held that the taxpayer had the authority to write
corporate checks and could not delegate that authority to
escape responsibility for the taxes where the taxpayer
continued to write checks for himself.  Also, the taxpayer
could not use the lack of knowledge of accounting or tax
law where the taxpayer could learn such things from the
corporate accountant.  Peterson v. U.S., 7 5 8
F.Supp. 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
The taxpayer, a shareholder, director and president of a
corporation, was held to be a responsible person liable for
the corporation's failure to pay employment taxes.  The
taxpayer was found to have been active in the daily
operation of the company and to have authority to and did
co-sign company checks.  The taxpayer's liability was not
removed by assigning payroll matters to the company's
accountant, where the accountant did not have the authority
to write checks.  Peek v. U.S., 91-1 U.S. Tax. Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,208 (D. Md. 1991).
AGRICULTURAL LAW DIGEST
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  S CORPORATIONS  
AFFILIATED GROUP.  The corporation had three
subsidiaries.  The first subsidiary had not acquired any assets
and was not formally activated.  The second subsidiary sold
all of its assets to the parent corporation prior to the
corporation's election for S corporation status.  The third
subsidiary had also discontinued business, sold all assets,
closed all accounts and paid all liabilities prior to the S
corporation election.  However, the merger of the
subsidiaries under state law was not completed until after
the S corporation was effective.  The IRS ruled that the
subsidiaries were sufficiently inactive to allow the parent
corporation to elect S corporation status.  Ltr. R u l .
9116001, Nov. 16, 1990.
SHAREHOLDER.  The taxpayer received stock in an S
corporation as part of a divorce property settlement prior to
the end of the corporation's taxable year.  The taxpayer
listed the stock on Form 1120S as owned by the taxpayer
and the taxpayer's former spouse's Form 1120S reflected the
termination of ownership of the stock.  The court held that
the taxpayer was the beneficial owner of the stock and liable
for income tax on the stock's share of corporation income.
Willie v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-182.
TRAVEL EXPENSES .  The taxpayer originally
owned a swimming pool business in Massachusetts and
started a second horse breeding and racing business in
Florida.  The taxpayer spent approximately six consecutive
months in each location.  The Tax Court had held that the
taxpayer had two tax residences and that the travel and living
expenses attributable to the horse operation were not
deductible as business expenses.  The appellate court held
that Section 162 contemplated only one residence for tax
purposes and that the travel and living expenses attributable
to one of the businesses was eligible for a business
deduction; the court did not determine which residence was
the tax residence.  Andrews v. Comm'r, 91-1 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,211 (1st Cir. 1991), vac'g
and rem'g T.C. Memo. 1990-391.
MORTGAGES
REDEMPTION.  The plaintiff had a mortgage on
land owned by the debtors and obtained a judgment of
foreclosure.  At the sheriff's sale, the land was purchased by
a third party.  Within the period of redemption, the plaintiff
filed a notice of redemption, citing its deficiency judgment
as a lien against the property.  The court held that the
plaintiff had no right of redemption under Kansas law
because the mortgage was extinguished by the foreclosure
decree and only pre-foreclosure lien holders had a right to
redeem.  Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Brown,
807 P.2d 702 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
Thomas v. U.S., 758 F.Supp 529 (E.D. M o .
1991) (profit motive), see p. 75 supra.
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